Docket No. 86610-4 (from Court of Appeals Division III Case No. 29164-2)
Synopsis: Whether a police officer responding to a report of a possible intoxicated driver improperly stopped the driver on a pretext when he pulled the driver over for having an unlawfully modified muffler.
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Wash. Off Highway Vehicle Alliance v. State
Docket No. 86602-3 (from Court of Appeals Division II Case No. 40521-1)
Synopsis: Whether an appropriation allocating a portion of motor vehicle fuel tax revenues to the Washington State Parks and Recreation Commission constitutes a permissible “refund” of fuel tax revenues to off-highway vehicle users.
Synopsis: Whether an appropriation allocating a portion of motor vehicle fuel tax revenues to the Washington State Parks and Recreation Commission constitutes a permissible “refund” of fuel tax revenues to off-highway vehicle users.
State v. Ortega
Docket No. 85788-1 (from Court of Appeals Division I Case No. 64008-9)
Synopsis: Whether the defendant in a misdemeanor drug prosecution was lawfully arrested when the officer who witnessed the crime did not make the arrest but directed other officers who did not witness the crime to make the arrest.
Synopsis: Whether the defendant in a misdemeanor drug prosecution was lawfully arrested when the officer who witnessed the crime did not make the arrest but directed other officers who did not witness the crime to make the arrest.
State v. Hunley
Docket No. 86135-8 (from Court of Appeals Division II Case No. 39676-9)
Synopsis: Whether RCW 9.94A.500(1) and .530(2), which provide that a prosecutor’s criminal history summary is prima facie evidence of a defendant’s prior convictions, and that a defendant’s “acknowledgment” of criminal history includes not objecting to the prosecutor’s summary, unconstitutionally relieves the State of its burden to prove prior convictions for sentencing purposes.
Synopsis: Whether RCW 9.94A.500(1) and .530(2), which provide that a prosecutor’s criminal history summary is prima facie evidence of a defendant’s prior convictions, and that a defendant’s “acknowledgment” of criminal history includes not objecting to the prosecutor’s summary, unconstitutionally relieves the State of its burden to prove prior convictions for sentencing purposes.
State v. Coristine
Docket No. 86145-5 (from Court of Appeals Division III Case No. 28868-4)
Synopsis: Whether, in a prosecution for second degree rape by means of intercourse with a person unable to consent due to mental incapacity or physical helplessness, the trial court properly instructed the jury on the affirmative defense of reasonable belief that the victim was capable of consent, even though the defendant objected to the instruction and asserted only the defense that the State could not prove that the victim was incapacitated.
Synopsis: Whether, in a prosecution for second degree rape by means of intercourse with a person unable to consent due to mental incapacity or physical helplessness, the trial court properly instructed the jury on the affirmative defense of reasonable belief that the victim was capable of consent, even though the defendant objected to the instruction and asserted only the defense that the State could not prove that the victim was incapacitated.
State v. Rice
Docket No. 85893-4 (from Court of Appeals Division II Case No. 39600-9)
Synopsis: Whether statutes that require the prosecutor to allege certain sentence enhancing factors (that the crime was sexually motivated, that the sex offense was predatory, that the sex offense victim was less than 15 years old) when the evidence supports those factors violates the separation of powers doctrine.
Synopsis: Whether statutes that require the prosecutor to allege certain sentence enhancing factors (that the crime was sexually motivated, that the sex offense was predatory, that the sex offense victim was less than 15 years old) when the evidence supports those factors violates the separation of powers doctrine.
McDevitt v. Harborview Medical Center
Docket No. 85367-3 (from King Case No. 10-2-24679-7 SEA)
Synopsis: Whether the medical malpractice claim notice requirements of RCW 7.70.100(1), found unconstitutional in Waples v. Yi, 169 Wn.2d 152, 234 P.3d 187 (2010), remain applicable to malpractice suits against the State.
Synopsis: Whether the medical malpractice claim notice requirements of RCW 7.70.100(1), found unconstitutional in Waples v. Yi, 169 Wn.2d 152, 234 P.3d 187 (2010), remain applicable to malpractice suits against the State.
Minnick, et al. v. Clearwire US LLC, et al.
Docket No. 85810-1 (from Federal Case No. 10-35228)
Synopsis: Whether under Washington law an early termination fee charged by an internet and telephone service provider to subscribers who cancel their services before the end of the contract term is a lawful alternative performance provision or an unlawful liquidated damages clause.
Synopsis: Whether under Washington law an early termination fee charged by an internet and telephone service provider to subscribers who cancel their services before the end of the contract term is a lawful alternative performance provision or an unlawful liquidated damages clause.
Peck v. AT&T Mobility
Docket No. 85581-1 (from King Case No. 09-2-45435-3) Facts: Petitioner Jared Peck purchased three cellular telephones and a monthly service plan for each telephone from respondent AT&T Mobility. The service agreement that Peck signed for each plan included a clause stating that, in addition to the cost for the monthly service fee and other optional plan features, a regulatory cost recovery surcharge would also be imposed to recoup business and occupation taxes. Peck subsequently filed suit against AT&T Mobility on grounds that it is prohibited by the business and occupation tax statute (Washington Revised Code §82.04.500) from recouping business and occupation taxes by adding a regulatory cost recovery surcharge. AT&T Mobility removed the case to federal district court, where it was granted summary judgment. Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit certified to the Supreme Court of Washington the question of whether the surcharge is prohibited by §82.04.500. Continue reading
Tacoma v. Bonney Lake
Docket No. 84824-6 (from King Case No. 09-2-45435-3) Facts: The petitioner city of Tacoma has franchise agreements to supply the respondent city of Bonney Lake and other municipalities in Pierce County with water services. Following the Supreme Court of Washington’s decision in Lane v. Seattle, in which the Court held that the city of Seattle cannot charge its ratepayers a fire hydrant fee, the city of Tacoma ceased charging ratepayers for the cost of providing and maintaining fire hydrants for the municipalities and instead billed the municipalities. When the municipalities refused to pay, the city of Tacoma subsequently petitioned the Superior Court for King County for a declaratory judgment that the municipalities are responsible for the costs of providing and maintaining their fire hydrants. The superior court granted summary judgment for the municipalities, ruling that the indemnification and hold harmless provisions in the franchise agreements preclude the city of Tacoma’s declaratory judgment action and require the city of Tacoma to bear all costs associated with providing and maintaining fire hydrants for the municipalities. Continue reading