State v. Sanchez

Docket No. 87740-8 (from Court of Appeals Division I Case No. 67461-7)
Synopsis: Whether, in light of a 2011 amendment to RCW 7.09.345 that requires the end-of-sentence review committee to assign risk levels to sex offenders (Laws of 2011, ch. 338, § 5), a juvenile court was nonetheless required by RCW 4.24.550(6) to transmit a juvenile offender’s Special Sex Offender Disposition Alternative evaluation to the county sheriff for risk classification.

In re Custody of B.M.H.

Docket No. 86895-6 (from Court of Appeals Division II Case No. 41211-0)
Synopsis: Whether a former stepparent may acquire the status of defacto parent of a child with only one living biological parent, and whether the former stepparent in this case made an adequate showing that relocation of the child to a different city would be detrimental to the child’s growth and development, justifying a show cause hearing on a nonparent custody petition.

In re the Dependency of Sleasman

Docket No. 86124-2 (from Court of Appeals Division I Case No. 65565-5)
Synopsis: Whether in a proceeding to terminate parental rights a finding that the conditions underlying the child’s dependency are unlikely to be remedied in the near future necessarily supports a finding that continuation of the parent-child relationship diminishes the child’s prospects for integration into a stable and permanent home. See RCW 13.34.180(e), (f).

State v. Saenz

Docket No. 84949-8 (from Court of Appeals Division III Case No. 27683-0)
Synopsis: Whether, in attempting to prove the existence of a prior strike offense for persistent offender purposes, the State adequately established that the defendant, who was a juvenile when he committed the prior offense, validly waived juvenile court jurisdiction and consented to trial in adult court, qualifying the offense as a strike offense.

In re dependency of M.S.R.

Docket No. 85729-6 (from King Case No. 08-7-01089-7)  Facts:  The respondent Department of Social and Health Services petitioned the Superior Court for King County to terminate the parental rights of petitioner Nyakat Luak with regard to her sons M.S.R. and T.S.R. on grounds that Luak suffers from psychological incapacities and mental deficiencies so severe and chronic as to render her unable to provide proper care for her children.  Following a trial, Luak’s parental rights were terminated on the basis of the trial court’s findings that the state had expressly and understandably offered Luak services to correct her parental deficiencies and that there was little likelihood that these deficiencies could be corrected in the foreseeable future.  Luak appealed the trial court’s decision, asserting that these findings were not supported by sufficient evidence and that not appointing counsel to represent the children during the proceedings denied them their constitutional right to counsel. Continue reading

Washington v. R.P.H.

Docket No. 82557-2 (from Court of Appeals Division I Case No. 60552-6)  Facts:  As a minor, petitioner R.P.H. was convicted of the rape of a child.  The trial court subsequently sentenced him to a suspended term of confinement, one year of community supervision, and sexual deviancy treatment and imposed various other requirements, including a requirement that he register as a sex offender and a requirement that he not use or possess a weapon of any kind.  After R.P.H. successfully completed treatment and fulfilled the other conditions of his sentence, he petitioned the Superior Court for King County to remove the registration requirement and to restore his right to possess a firearm.  The superior court granted the motion to remove the registration requirement but denied the motion to restore R.PH.’s right to possess a firearm.  R.P.H. appealed the superior court’s ruling, asserting that his right to possess a firearm should have been restored automatically pursuant to Washington Revised Code §9.41.040(3), which provides that no person shall be precluded from possessing a firearm if they have been the subject of a certificate of rehabilitation.  The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court’s decision. Continue reading

Washington v. Posey

Docket No. 82957-8 (from Court of Appeals Division III Case No. 26771-7)  Facts:  Petitioner Daniel Posey was charged with second degree rape and first degree assault.  Although Posey was a juvenile at the time, the case was transferred from juvenile court to the Superior Court for Yakima County because Washington Revised Code §13.04.030(37)(a)(v) classifies first degree assault as a “serious violent offense.”  Posey was ultimately convicted of second degree rape but acquitted of first degree assault.  Posey was subsequently sentenced under the adult sentencing guidelines to life in prison.  Posey appealed his sentence on grounds that the superior court lacked the authority to sentence him under the adult sentencing guidelines insofar as he had been acquitted of the charge upon which its jurisdiction had been based.  The Supreme Court of Washington agreed and remanded the case to the juvenile court for resentencing.  However, as Posey had in the interim reached the age of 21, the juvenile court no longer had jurisdiction over him and he was instead sentenced by the superior court to a standard juvenile range sentence of 60 to 80 weeks in prison.  Posey appealed his sentence, asserting that by virtue of his age and the juvenile court’s assumption of jurisdiction neither the juvenile court nor the superior court have jurisdiction to sentence him. Continue reading