Blog Archives

Washington v. Breitung

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Docket No. 84580-8 (from Court of Appeals Division II Case No. 38869-3)  Facts:  Respondent Robert Breitung was convicted of two counts of second degree assault and one count of second degree unlawful possession of a firearm in the Superior Court for Pierce County after threatening two men with a firearm that it was unlawful for him to possess due to a prior conviction for domestic violence assault.  Breitung appealed his convictions, asserting that his attorney had been ineffective in failing to request a lesser included offense instruction to the jury and that he could not be convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm insofar as he had not been given sufficient notice that he was prohibited from possessing a firearm as a consequence of his conviction for domestic violence assault.  The Washington Court of Appeals reversed Breitung’s convictions, holding that his attorney had been ineffective and that he had not been provided the notice of his firearm prohibition that Washington Revised Code §9.41.047(1) requires. Continue reading →

Edmonson v. Popchoi

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Docket No. 84695-2 (from Court of Appeals Division I Case No. 63051-2)  Facts:  Petitioner Csaba Kiss sold a parcel of land to respondent Ivan Popchoi and his wife pursuant to a statutory warranty deed that included a duty to defend against any claims to title.  After J.E. and Naomi Edmonson, the owners of an adjacent property, brought an adverse possession claim to a portion of the property in the Superior Court for King County, Kiss declined to assist in defending against the claim and instead agreed to pay damages to compensate the Popchois for the value of the disputed portion of the property. Continue reading →

Washington v. R.P.H.

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Docket No. 82557-2 (from Court of Appeals Division I Case No. 60552-6)  Facts:  As a minor, petitioner R.P.H. was convicted of the rape of a child.  The trial court subsequently sentenced him to a suspended term of confinement, one year of community supervision, and sexual deviancy treatment and imposed various other requirements, including a requirement that he register as a sex offender and a requirement that he not use or possess a weapon of any kind.  After R.P.H. successfully completed treatment and fulfilled the other conditions of his sentence, he petitioned the Superior Court for King County to remove the registration requirement and to restore his right to possess a firearm.  The superior court granted the motion to remove the registration requirement but denied the motion to restore R.PH.’s right to possess a firearm.  R.P.H. appealed the superior court’s ruling, asserting that his right to possess a firearm should have been restored automatically pursuant to Washington Revised Code §9.41.040(3), which provides that no person shall be precluded from possessing a firearm if they have been the subject of a certificate of rehabilitation.  The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court’s decision. Continue reading →

Mellish v. Frog Mountain Pet Care

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Docket No. 84246-9 (from Court of Appeals Division II Case No. 37583-4)  Facts:  Respondent Frog Mountain Pet Care applied for a conditional use permit to expand its pet boarding facility.  Petitioner Martin Mellish, the owner of an adjoining property, opposed the application.  After a hearing examiner approved the application, Mellish filed an unsuccessful motion for reconsideration.  Mellish subsequently filed a land use petition pursuant to the Land Use Petition Act (Washington Revised Code §36.70C) in the Superior Court for Clallam County.  The trial court reversed the hearing examiner’s decision.  Frog Mountain Pet Care appealed, asserting that Mellish’s land use petition had been untimely insofar as it had been filed more than 21 days after the hearing examiner’s initial decision to approve the application. Continue reading →

Whatcom County Fire District #21 v. Whatcom County

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Docket No. 83611-6 (from Court of Appeals Division I Case No. 61431-2)  Facts: Respondent Whatcom County approved three development applications despite the refusal of the petitioner Whatcom County Fire District #21 to issue letters to the developers stating that adequate capacity to serve the proposed developments exists. Whatcom County Fire District #21 subsequently filed a petition in the Superior Court for Whatcom County that challenged the approvals pursuant to the Land Use Petition Act (Washington Revised Code §36.70C). Continue reading →

Cary v. Mason County

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Docket No. 83937-9 (from Court of Appeals Division II Case No. 37981-3)  Facts:  The Mason County Board of Commissioners levied a special assessment on property of $5 per parcel in order to raise funds dedicated to addressing water resource protection issues in the county.  James Cary subsequently petitioned the Superior Court for Mason County for a declaratory judgment that assessing a per parcel rate without assessing a per acre rate violates Washington Revised Code §89.08.400(3).  The superior court ruled that the assessment is invalid.  Upon appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals reversed, holding that §89.08.400(3) does not require that both a per parcel and a per acre rate be assessed. Continue reading →

Bank of America v. Treiger

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Docket No. 84044-0 (from Court of Appeals Division I Case No. 61671-4)  Facts:  Following respondent Kenneth Treiger’s separation from his wife J’Amy Owens and pending the dissolution of their marriage, Owens purchased a home.  When Treiger and Owens both subsequently filed for bankruptcy, the Superior Court for King County entered a decree dissolving the marriage but staying distribution of community property until the conclusion of the bankruptcy proceedings.  After the bankruptcy court determined that the home that Owens purchased is community property, the superior court ordered the sale of the home and ruled that Treiger is entitled to half of the proceeds.  The superior court also issued supplemental documents awarding Treiger attorney’s fees and an additional share of the proceeds of the home, fining Owens for failing to sign an agreement listing the home for sale, and giving Treiger the authority to close the sale of the home   In the interim, the Retail Group, a business of which Owens is a part owner, had defaulted on a promissory note and borrowing agreement with petitioner Bank of America, which obtained a judgment against Owens.  Bank of America subsequently petitioned the Superior Court for King County for a declaratory judgment determining the priority of its interest in the proceeds of the sale of the home.  The superior court ruled that the earlier order awarding Treiger half of the proceeds of the sale of the home did not grant Treiger a lien or any other interest in the property and that Bank of America’s lien therefore has first priority. Continue reading →

Snohomish County Public Transportation Benefit Area Corporation v. FirstGroup America, Inc.

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Docket No. 83795-3 (from Court of Appeals Division I Case No. 62269-2)  Facts:  The petitioner Snohomish County Public Transportation Benefit Area Corporation, doing business as Community Transit, entered into a contract with respondent FirstGroup America, Inc., doing business as First Transit, under which First Transit agreed to provide bus services between Snohomish County and parts of King County for Community Transit.  The contract included an indemnity provision requiring that First Transit indemnify Community Transit for any losses occasioned in whole or in part by the presence of First Transit buses except for those resulting solely from the negligence of Community Transit.  Following a multiple vehicle accident involving a Community Transit bus, a First Transit bus, and two other automobiles that was caused by the shared negligence of the driver of the Community Transit bus and the driver of one of the other automobiles, Community Transit tendered a claim of indemnification to First Transit.  After First Transit refused to indemnify Community Transit, Community Transit settled the claims against it by the drivers of the other automobiles and filed suit against First Transit in the Superior Court for Snohomish County, asserting that First Transit had breached the contract. Continue reading →