Docket No. 86610-4 (from Court of Appeals Division III Case No. 29164-2)
Synopsis: Whether a police officer responding to a report of a possible intoxicated driver improperly stopped the driver on a pretext when he pulled the driver over for having an unlawfully modified muffler.
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State v. Ruem
Docket No. 86214-1 (from Court of Appeals Division II Case No. 39053-1)
Synopsis: Whether police officers seeking consent to enter a defendant’s home to execute an arrest warrant on the defendant’s brother were required to advise the defendant of his right to refuse consent under State v. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 262, 960 P.2d 927 (1998).
Synopsis: Whether police officers seeking consent to enter a defendant’s home to execute an arrest warrant on the defendant’s brother were required to advise the defendant of his right to refuse consent under State v. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 262, 960 P.2d 927 (1998).
State v. Byrd
Docket No. 86399-7 (from Court of Appeals Division III Case No. 29056-5)
Synopsis: Whether the warrantless search of a car occupant’s purse incident to the occupant’s arrest outside the car is unlawful under Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2009).
Synopsis: Whether the warrantless search of a car occupant’s purse incident to the occupant’s arrest outside the car is unlawful under Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2009).
State v. Sweany
Docket No. 86270-2 (from Court of Appeals Division III Case No. 28860-9)
Synopsis: Whether in a prosecution for first degree arson on the basis of fire damage to “property valued at ten thousand dollars or more with intent to collect insurance proceeds,” RCW 9A.48.020(1)(d), the term “valued at” means the fair market value of the property or the value of the insurance coverage of the property.
Synopsis: Whether in a prosecution for first degree arson on the basis of fire damage to “property valued at ten thousand dollars or more with intent to collect insurance proceeds,” RCW 9A.48.020(1)(d), the term “valued at” means the fair market value of the property or the value of the insurance coverage of the property.
State v. Sisouvanh
Docket No. 85422-0 (from Benton Case No. 08-1-00685-2)
Synopsis: Whether for purposes of evaluating a criminal defendant’s competency to stand trial, the term “qualified expert or professional person” under RCW 10.77.060(1)(a) requires a competency evaluator to be qualified to assess the defendant’s competency in light of the defendant’s cultural background.
Synopsis: Whether for purposes of evaluating a criminal defendant’s competency to stand trial, the term “qualified expert or professional person” under RCW 10.77.060(1)(a) requires a competency evaluator to be qualified to assess the defendant’s competency in light of the defendant’s cultural background.
State v. Chambers
Docket No. 86474-8 (from Court of Appeals Division II Case No. 40899-6)
Synopsis: Whether a criminal defendant’s guilty pleas entered in three separate cause numbers was part of an indivisible plea agreement precluding withdrawal of the plea entered in one of the cause numbers.
Synopsis: Whether a criminal defendant’s guilty pleas entered in three separate cause numbers was part of an indivisible plea agreement precluding withdrawal of the plea entered in one of the cause numbers.
State v. Rose
Docket No. 85791-1 (from Court of Appeals Division III Case No. 28403-4)
Synopsis: Whether for purposes of the crime of possession of stolen property consisting of an access device, an unactivated credit card received in a mail solicitation constitutes an “access device.”
Synopsis: Whether for purposes of the crime of possession of stolen property consisting of an access device, an unactivated credit card received in a mail solicitation constitutes an “access device.”
State v. Hunley
Docket No. 86135-8 (from Court of Appeals Division II Case No. 39676-9)
Synopsis: Whether RCW 9.94A.500(1) and .530(2), which provide that a prosecutor’s criminal history summary is prima facie evidence of a defendant’s prior convictions, and that a defendant’s “acknowledgment” of criminal history includes not objecting to the prosecutor’s summary, unconstitutionally relieves the State of its burden to prove prior convictions for sentencing purposes.
Synopsis: Whether RCW 9.94A.500(1) and .530(2), which provide that a prosecutor’s criminal history summary is prima facie evidence of a defendant’s prior convictions, and that a defendant’s “acknowledgment” of criminal history includes not objecting to the prosecutor’s summary, unconstitutionally relieves the State of its burden to prove prior convictions for sentencing purposes.
State v. Coristine
Docket No. 86145-5 (from Court of Appeals Division III Case No. 28868-4)
Synopsis: Whether, in a prosecution for second degree rape by means of intercourse with a person unable to consent due to mental incapacity or physical helplessness, the trial court properly instructed the jury on the affirmative defense of reasonable belief that the victim was capable of consent, even though the defendant objected to the instruction and asserted only the defense that the State could not prove that the victim was incapacitated.
Synopsis: Whether, in a prosecution for second degree rape by means of intercourse with a person unable to consent due to mental incapacity or physical helplessness, the trial court properly instructed the jury on the affirmative defense of reasonable belief that the victim was capable of consent, even though the defendant objected to the instruction and asserted only the defense that the State could not prove that the victim was incapacitated.
State v. Allen
Docket No. 86119-6 (from Court of Appeals Division I Case No. 64466-1)
Synopsis: Whether in a criminal prosecution involving a defendant and an eyewitness of different races the trial court should instruct the jury on the difficulty of cross-racial identification when identification is at issue and there is no other corroborating evidence.
Synopsis: Whether in a criminal prosecution involving a defendant and an eyewitness of different races the trial court should instruct the jury on the difficulty of cross-racial identification when identification is at issue and there is no other corroborating evidence.