Synopsis: Whether the State had jurisdiction to prosecute for fishing violations a member of the Yakama Nation who was fishing at a Columbia River off-reservation treaty fishing site set aside in lieu of traditional fishing grounds inundated by dam construction. Read more...

Synopsis: Whether a tortfeasor's automobile personal injury protection and liability insurer must pay a pro rata shore of the injured plaintiff's legal expenses in obtaining a liability recovery before it may offset its previous personal injury protection payments to the plaintiff. Read more...

Facts:  Petitioner James Eastmond was convicted of first degree robbery and first degree burglary and sentenced to an enhanced sentenced on the basis of the jury’s finding that Eastmond committed the crimes while armed with a firearm.  Eastmond appealed his sentence but the Supreme Court of Washington denied Eastmond’s petition for review.  However, the Supreme Court of Washington subsequently decided in Washington v. Williams-Walker that a firearm sentence enhancement may only be imposed after the jury makes the required finding of fact by special verdict and that the erroneous imposition of a firearm sentence enhancement can never be deemed harmless error.  Consequently, Eastmond filed a personal restraint petition asserting that this decision requires that his sentence be vacated. Read more...

Facts:  Petitioner John Hurst was charged with third degree assault in the Superior Court for King County.  However, the superior court subsequently found Hurst incompetent to stand trial and ordered him committed to Western State Hospital for 90 days to restore his competency.  After 90 days elapsed, the superior court found that Hurst was still incompetent and ordered him committed for an additional 90 days.  90 days later, a jury trial was convened pursuant to Washington Revised Code §10.77.086(4) to determine whether Hurst should remain committed.  The jury found that while Hurst does not present a substantial danger to other persons there is a substantial likelihood that he will commit criminal acts jeopardizing public safety or security and that there is a substantial probability that will regain competency within a reasonable period of time.  The trial court subsequently entered an order committing Hurst for an additional 180 days.  Upon appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order, holding that §10.77.086(4) only requires that the state prove dangerousness on the basis of a preponderance of the evidence and that this standard does not deny defendants whose competency is questioned due process of law. Read more...

Facts:  The petitioner city of Tacoma has franchise agreements to supply the respondent city of Bonney Lake and other municipalities in Pierce County with water services.  Following the Supreme Court of Washington’s decision in Lane v. Seattle, in which the Court held that the city of Seattle cannot charge its ratepayers a fire hydrant fee, the city of Tacoma ceased charging ratepayers for the cost of providing and maintaining fire hydrants for the municipalities and instead billed the municipalities.  When the municipalities refused to pay, the city of Tacoma subsequently petitioned the Superior Court for King County for a declaratory judgment that the municipalities are responsible for the costs of providing and maintaining their fire hydrants.  The superior court granted summary judgment for the municipalities, ruling that the indemnification and hold harmless provisions in the franchise agreements preclude the city of Tacoma’s declaratory judgment action and require the city of Tacoma to bear all costs associated with providing and maintaining fire hydrants for the municipalities. Read more...

Facts:  After petitioner Jose Morales crashed into another motorist in his automobile and fled the scene, he was arrested by a state trooper.  Because the trooper found evidence that Morales was under the influence of alcohol, he transported Morales to a hospital in order to have a blood alcohol test performed.  Due to the fact that Morales speaks limited English, the trooper instructed an interpreter to inform Morales, as required by Washington Revised Code §46.20.308, that he would be subject to a blood alcohol test and that he had a right to an independent test.  After a trial in which the results of the blood alcohol test were admitted into evidence, Morales was convicted of hit and run, driving under the influence of alcohol, and vehicular assault by driving a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor and in a reckless manner.  Morales appealed his convictions, asserting that the results of the blood alcohol test were inadmissible insofar as the state failed to prove that he had been apprised of his rights under §46.20.308 given that the interpreter had not testified at trial. Read more...

Facts:  Respondent Tesoro Refining & Marketing Company produces marine bunker fuel for foreign consumption at its refinery near Anacortes.  Under Washington Revised Code §82.04.433, proceeds from the foreign sale of oil products may be deducted in calculating liability for business and occupation taxes on oil products.  This deducation was claimed by Tesoro Refining & Marketing Company in its tax returns for both its business and occupation tax on wholesaling and retailing and its business and occupation tax on manufacturing.  After the Department of Revenue’s appeals division ruled that the deduction does not apply to business and occupation taxes on manufacturing, Tesoro Refining & Marketing Company petitioned the Superior Court for Thurston County for a declaratory judgment that the deduction is not limited to business and occupation taxes on wholesaling and retailing.  In the interim, the legislature enacted a retroactive clarifying amendment to §82.04.433 that expressly limits the deduction to business and occupation taxes on wholesaling and retailing.  The superior court granted summary judgment for the Department of Revenue. Read more...

Facts:  Respondent Z.D.I. Gaming, Inc. filed an application with the petitioner Washington State Gambling Commission requesting permission to distribute a new type of electronic gaming machine that it had developed.  After the Washington State Gambling Commission denied the application on grounds that the machine’s use of a “cash card” violates Washington Administrative Code §230-30-070’s requirement that all prizes be awarded in either cash or merchandise, Z.D.I. Gaming petitioned the Superior Court for Pierce County for judicial review.  The Washington State Gambling Commission moved for dismissal, asserting that Washington Revised Code §9.46.095 confers exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over cases in which the Washington State Gambling Commission is a party upon the Superior Court for Thurston County.  The superior court denied the motion to dismiss but transferred the case to the Superior Court for Thurston County, which reversed the Washington State Gambling Commission’s denial of Z.D.I. Gaming’s application. Read more...

Facts:  Respondent Mathew McCleary and his wife Stephanie, individually and on behalf of their children enrolled in the state of Washington’s public school system, filed suit against the state in the Superior Court for King County.  The McClearys asserted that the state is violating its duty under Article IX §1 of the Washington State Constitution to adequately fund its K-12 school system.  The trial court found in favor of the McClearys, ruling that state funding for K-12 education is not ample, not stable, and not dependable and ordering the legislature to proceed with real and measurable progress.  The state of Washington appealed this decision directly to the Supreme Court of Washington. Read more...

Facts:  Petitioner Michael Gresham was convicted of three counts of first degree child molestation and one count of attempted first degree child molestation in the Superior Court for Snohomish County after a trial in which evidence of Gresham’s prior conviction for a sex offense was admitted pursuant to Washington Revised Code §10.58.090.  Gresham appealed his conviction, asserting that §10.58.090 violates the separation of powers as it conflicts with Washington Rule of Evidence 404(b), which bars the introduction of evidence of prior misconduct for the purpose of showing the defendant’s character and action in conformity with that character.  The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed Gresham’s convictions. Read more...