Synopsis: Whether damages caused by collapsed shoring during the construction of a building are covered under the ensuing loss provision of an all-risk insurance policy that excludes coverage for faulty workmanship design and defects, and whether damages from the imminent collapse of a home deck are covered under the ensuing loss provision of an all-risk homeowners policy that excludes coverage for construction defects and rot. Note: This case was consolidated with Sprague v. Safeco Insurance Company of America (No. 85794-6) for argument, but was decided separately.

Synopsis: What is the proper interpretation of an “ensuing loss clause” in an all-risk insurance policy? Note: This case was consolidated with Vision One, LLC v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co. (No. 85350-9) for argument, but was decided separately.

Facts:  Petitioner Jared Peck purchased three cellular telephones and a monthly service plan for each telephone from respondent AT&T Mobility.  The service agreement that Peck signed for each plan included a clause stating that, in addition to the cost for the monthly service fee and other optional plan features, a regulatory cost recovery surcharge would also be imposed to recoup business and occupation taxes.  Peck subsequently filed suit against AT&T Mobility on grounds that it is prohibited by the business and occupation tax statute (Washington Revised Code §82.04.500) from recouping business and occupation taxes by adding a regulatory cost recovery surcharge.  AT&T Mobility removed the case to federal district court, where it was granted summary judgment.  Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit certified to the Supreme Court of Washington the question of whether the surcharge is prohibited by §82.04.500. Read more...

Facts:  A Yakima District Court judge issued a warrant to search petitioner Patrick Lyons’ property on the basis of an affidavit provided by the Yakima Police Department which detailed information provided by a confidential source indicating that there was a marijuana growing operation on Lyons’ property.  After the subsequent search revealed marijuana plants, supplies for packaging marijuana, and a large quantity of mushrooms, Lyons was charged with manufacturing marijuana, possesion of marijuana with intent to deliver, and possession of mushrooms with intent to deliver.  Lyons moved to suppress the evidence derived from the search on grounds that because the affidavit said nothing about the timing of the confidential source’s observation, it failed to state timely probable cause.  The trial court granted Lyons’ motion.  Upon appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals reversed, holding that language in the affidavit stating that the confidential source contacted the Yakima Police Department “within the last 48 hours” could be read to apply both to the time of contact and to the time of the confidential source’s observations. Read more...

Facts:  Respondent Brian Siers was charged with two counts of second degree assault after stabbing two men, one of whom was attempting to break up a fight between Siers and another person, outside of a Seattle restaurant.  Although no aggravating circumstances were alleged in the information, the state of Washington notified Siers prior to trial of its intent to seek a good Samaritan aggravator on one of the counts.  After the state and Siers had each rested their case, Siers objected to the state’s proposed jury instructions on grounds that the good Samaritan aggravator had not been charged in the information.  The trial court overruled Siers’ objection and Siers was found guilty of both charges.  The jury also returned a special verdict finding that Siers assaulted one of the victims while they were acting as a good Samaritan.  Siers appealed his conviction and the Washington Court of Appeals reversed on grounds that the state’s failure to plead the good Samaritan aggravator in the information functionally undermined the jury’s verdict on the substantive crime of second degree assault. Read more...

Facts:  Respondent Business Services of America II, Inc. filed suit against petitioner WaferTech, L.L.C. in the Superior Court for Clark County following a construction contract dispute.  The trial court dismissed Business Services of America II’s claims and awarded WaferTech attorney fees.  Upon appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, affirming the dismissal of most of Business Services of America II’s claims but reversing and remanding with respect to a lien foreclosure claim.  The trial court subsequently entered a stipulation and order for return of exhibits.  Neither party responded to the order.  Two years later, Business Services of America II’s attorney filed a notice of intent to withdraw.  The notice inaccurately stated that the case had been dismissed and judgment entered against Business Services of America II.  One year later, Business Services of America II, under new ownership, moved to try the remanded lien claim and the case was noted for trial.  However, the trial court subsequently granted WaferTech’s motion for dismissal, ruling that Business Services of America II’s dilatoriness and deception constituted unacceptable litigation practices.  Upon appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Washington State Court Rule 41(b)(1), which states that a case shall not be dismissed if it is noted for trial before the hearing on the motion to dismiss, prohibits dismissal. Read more...

Facts:  Respondent Mansour Heidari was convicted of first degree child rape, second degree child molestation, and third degree child molestation in the Superior Court for King County.  After exhausting his direct appeals, Heidari filed a personal restraint petition in the Washington Court of Appeals.  The Washington Court of Appeals granted the petition and vacated Heidari’s convictions, holding that the evidence supporting the convictions was insufficient as a matter of law because there had not been any actual sexual contact between Heidari and the victim.  The Washington Court of Appeals also denied the state of Washington’s motion to direct the entry of judgment on the lesser included offense of attempted second degree child molestation.  The state of Washington appealed this ruling to the Supreme Court of Washington. Read more...

Facts:  Respondent Dustin Gauntt was charged by the petitioner city of Auburn with possession of marijuana in violation of Washington Revised Code §69.50.4014 and the unlawful use of drug paraphernalia in violation of Washington Revised Code §69.50.412(1).  Gauntt moved to dismiss the charges on grounds that the city of Auburn lacks the authority to charge him with violating either state statute because it has not adopted them as part of its municipal code.  The Auburn Municipal Court denied the motion to dismiss and Gauntt was convicted of both charges.  Upon appeal, the Superior Court for King County reversed and ordered the charges against Gauntt dismissed. Read more...

Facts:  Respondent Michael Gendler was seriously injured while riding his bicycle across Seattle’s Montlake Bridge when the bicycle’s front wheel was suddenly caught in a seam on the bridge’s deck grating, throwing Gendler off of the bicycle and onto the roadway.  After learning that several other bicyclists had been injured in similar accidents on the same bridge, Gendler submitted a public records request to the Washington State Patrol for copies of police reports on all accidents on Montlake Bridge involving bicycles.  The Washington State Patrol conditioned release of the reports upon Gendler signing a certification that he would not use the records in a lawsuit against the state of Washington or any of its agencies.  Asserting that this requirement violates the Public Records Act (Washington Revised Code §42.56), Gendler subsequently filed suit against petitioner John Batiste, the chief of the Washington State Patrol, in the Superior Court for Thurston County. Read more...

Facts:  Petitioner Ronald Teter filed a medical malpractice action against his former physician, respondent Andrew Deck, in the Superior Court for King County.  Prior to trial, Teter’s expert witness withdrew due to a medical condition that made him unavailable for the scheduled trial date.  When his replacement also withdrew a month before trial after he discovered a professional conflict of interest, Teter notified Deck of his replacement by Dr. Thomas Fairchild and offered several dates for Dr. Fairchild to be deposed.  Instead, Deck moved to strike Dr. Fairchild as a witness and the trial court granted the motion.  After the case was reassigned to a new judge, the trial proceeded and ended in a verdict for the defense.  However, the trial court subsequently granted Teter’s motion for a new trial on grounds that the original judge’s order striking Dr. Fairchild as a witness was an error of law and that the defense counsel’s misconduct prevented a fair trial. Read more...