Facts: Petitioner S.S.Y., a juvenile, was convicted of first degree robbery and first degree assault in the Superior Court for Pierce County and sentenced to serve sentences for both crimes consecutively. S.S.Y. subsequently appealed his sentence, asserting that consecutive sentences violated the 5^th Amendment to the United States Constitution’s prohibition against double jeopardy and Washington Revised Code §13.40.180(1), which establishes that the aggregate of consecutive sentences shall not exceed 150% of the term imposed for the more serious offense when the offenses were committed through a single act or when one of the offenses constituted an element of the other. The Washington Court of Appeals ruled that consecutive sentences did not subject S.S.Y. to double jeopardy as the legislature intended to punish first degree robbery and first degree assault as separate crimes but remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether §13.40.180(1)’s limitation of aggregated sentences to 150% of the term imposed for the more serious offense applied insofar as the findings supporting S.S.Y.’s first degree assault conviction also supported an element of first degree robbery. S.S.Y. appealed the portion of the decision rejecting his double jeopardy claim to the Supreme Court of Washington.

Question(s): Did the legislature intend to punish first degree robbery and first degree assault separately?

If so, does §13.40.180(1) nonetheless limit S.S.Y.’s sentence to 150% of the term imposed for the more serious offense?

Conclusion: Chief Justice Madsen’s opinion for a unanimous Court affirmed the Washington Court of Appeals, concluding that the legislature’s intent to punish first degree robbery separately from first degree assault is made clear by the fact that first degree assault carries a significantly greater sentence than the crime of first degree robbery that is elevated by assault. As a result, the ordinarily more serious offense of robbery does not carry a penalty that incorporates punishment for the ordinarily less serious offense of assault, indicating that the legislature intended the offenses to be punished separately. However, the Court also held that the issue of whether §13.40.180(1) nonetheless limit S.S.Y.’s sentence to 150% of the term imposed for the more serious offense was not properly before it and therefore remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the crimes arose from a single act.

Docket No. 83299-4 (from Court of Appeals Division II Case No. 37250-9)

Petitioner: S.S.Y.

(Counsel: Rebecca Wold Bouchey)

Respondent: State of Washington

(Counsel: Kathleen Proctor)

Briefs:

Argument: Thursday, May 20, 2010 9:00am

[Source: TVW, http://tvw.org]

Decided: Thursday, October 28th, 2010

Prevailing Party: State of Washington (Respondent)

Vote: 9-0

Citation: Pending

Court: Madsen1 Court (2010-2011)

Madsen
(Majority)

Johnson

Alexander

Sanders

Chambers

Owens

Fairhurst

Johnson

Stephens