Facts: After a motorcycle crash, petitioner Robert St. John was arrested for driving under the influence of an intoxicant. The responding Seattle police officer gave St. John the statutory warning regarding Washington’s implied consent blood alcohol tests, RCW §46.20.308(5), and St. John refused the voluntary blood alcohol test. The officer received a search warrant for the blood alcohol test after St. John declined, and the test was subsequently conducted. St. John challenged the test, asserting that once a driver declined a voluntary test, obtaining a test warrant violates Washington’s implied consent statute, due process, and equitable estoppel. The Seattle municipal court entered a order suppressing the blood alcohol test results, and respondent City of Seattle appealed. The Superior Court for King County reversed the suppression order. St. John appealed, and the Court of Appeals certified the case directly to the Supreme Court of Washington for review.

Question(s): Does the implied consent statute allow the State to administer a blood alcohol test pursuant to a warrant after a driver has declined a voluntary blood alcohol test?

Does an implied consent warning violate due process if it does not inform drivers that an officer may seek a warrant for a blood alcohol test even if the driver declines a voluntary blood alcohol test?

Does the doctrine of equitable estoppel bar the State from seeking a warrant for a blood alcohol test after informing drivers that they may refuse the voluntary blood alcohol test?

Conclusion: Justice Owens’ opinion for the Court disagreed with St. John’s assertions, holding that RCW §46.20.308 did no preclude the officer from obtaining a search warrant for the blood alcohol test, and neither due process nor equitable estoppel required the officer to inform St. John of this possibility. RCW §46.20.308(5) only prohibits tests given pursuant to the implied consent statute after a driver had declined and not blood alcohol tests given pursuant to a warrant. Furthermore, there was no due process violation because the search warrant and subsequent test were consequences of the evidence that St. John was driving under the influence, and not because he refused to take the voluntary test. Thus, the Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment reversing the suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Docket No. 81992-1 (from King Case No. 06-1-07998-8 SEA)

Petitioner: Robert St. John

(Counsel: Ryan B. Robertson)

Respondent: City of Seattle

(Counsel: Thomas A. Carr and Rebecca C. Peterson)

Briefs:

Argument: Tuesday, May 19, 2009 9:00am

[Source: TVW, http://tvw.org]

Decided: Thursday, September 10th, 2009

Vote: 7-2

Opinion: 166 Wn.2d 941 (2009)

Court: Alexander4 Court (2008-2009)

Alexander

Johnson

Madsen

Sanders
(Dissent)

Chambers

Owens
(Majority)

Fairhurst

Johnson

Stephens