In re personal restraint of Coats

Docket No. 83544-6 (from Court of Appeals Division II Case No. 38894-4)  Facts:  Petitioner Jeffrey Coats was convicted of first degree robbery, conspiracy to commit first degree robbery, and conspiracy to commit first degree murder in the Superior Court for Pierce County and received three standard range sentences to be served concurrently.  Fourteen years later, Coats filed a personal restraint petition in the Washington Court of Appeals.  Coats asserted that his judgment and sentence were invalid on their face insofar as the judgment erroneously stated that the maximum penalty for conspiracy to commit first degree robbery is life in prison.  The Washington Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, holding that the error was a technical misstatement that had no effect upon Coats’ rights. Continue reading

Washington v. Posey

Docket No. 82957-8 (from Court of Appeals Division III Case No. 26771-7)  Facts:  Petitioner Daniel Posey was charged with second degree rape and first degree assault.  Although Posey was a juvenile at the time, the case was transferred from juvenile court to the Superior Court for Yakima County because Washington Revised Code §13.04.030(37)(a)(v) classifies first degree assault as a “serious violent offense.”  Posey was ultimately convicted of second degree rape but acquitted of first degree assault.  Posey was subsequently sentenced under the adult sentencing guidelines to life in prison.  Posey appealed his sentence on grounds that the superior court lacked the authority to sentence him under the adult sentencing guidelines insofar as he had been acquitted of the charge upon which its jurisdiction had been based.  The Supreme Court of Washington agreed and remanded the case to the juvenile court for resentencing.  However, as Posey had in the interim reached the age of 21, the juvenile court no longer had jurisdiction over him and he was instead sentenced by the superior court to a standard juvenile range sentence of 60 to 80 weeks in prison.  Posey appealed his sentence, asserting that by virtue of his age and the juvenile court’s assumption of jurisdiction neither the juvenile court nor the superior court have jurisdiction to sentence him. Continue reading