Docket No. 79172-4  Facts: After petitioner Mark Potter was cited for driving with a suspended driver’s license, his automobile was impounded and eventually auctioned by the respondent Washington State Patrol pursuant to the procedures outlined in Washington Administrative Code §204-96-010. Asserting that his automobile had been unlawfully converted, Potter filed a class action suit against the Washington State Patrol on behalf of himself and all of the owners of automobiles impounded pursuant to §204-96-010. Continue reading →

Docket No. 78331-4 (from Court of Appeals Division III Case No. 23692-7)  Facts:  Petitioner Cecile Woods filed suit against respondent Kittitas County in the Superior Court for Kittitas County pursuant to the Land Use Petition Act (Washington Revised Code §36.70C).  Woods sought the reversal of the Kittitas County Commission’s decision to rezone a parcel of land from forest and range to rural.  The superior court granted the petition and reversed the rezone, ruling that it was inconsistent with the Growth Management Act (Washington Revised Code §36.70A).  Upon appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide whether the rezone is consistent with the Growth Management Act. Continue reading →

Docket No. 79172-4  Facts:  After he was found driving with a suspended driver’s license, petitioner Mark Potter’s automobile was impounded by the respondent Washington State Patrol pursuant to the mandatory impoundment policy established by Washington Administrative Code §204-96-010.  Following the Supreme Court of Washington’s decision in All Around Underground, Inc. v. Washington State Patrol, in which the Court held that §204-96-010 is an unlawful exercise of the statutory authority granted to the Washington State Patrol in Washington Revised Code §46.55.113, Potter filed a class action lawsuit against the Washington State Patrol on behalf of himself and all of the owners of automobiles impounded pursuant to §204-96-010.  The trial court granted summary judgment for the Washington State Patrol, ruling that an action for conversion cannot be brought against the Washington State Patrol insofar as its actions were authorized by law and reasonable. Continue reading →

Docket No. 200,376-1 (from WSBA Case No. 5882)  Facts:  Petitioner Timothy Carpenter was charged with two counts of misconduct by the Washington State Bar Association’s Disciplinary Board arising out of his representation of two codefendents in a lawsuit to collect on a property transaction. Continue reading →

Docket No. 77891-4 (from Court of Appeals Division III Case No. 22609-3)  Facts: Petitioner Jerrie Vander Houwen was convicted of two counts of killing game out of season in the District Court for Yakima County after killing a number of elk that were damaging his cherry and apple orchards. Vander Houwen subsequently appealed his convictions, asserting that the trial court had erred in failing to instruct the jury that killing game out of season is not a crime if reasonably necessary for the defense of one’s property Continue reading →

Docket No. 78094-3 (from Court of Appeals Division II Case No. 31122-4)  Facts:  Respondent Gary Benn was convicted of two counts of aggravated murder in the Superior Court for Pierce County.  With regard to the presence of aggravating factors, the jury found that the murders were part of a common scheme or plan but did not return a verdict as to whether the murders were committed as a single act.  Benn’s convictions were subsequently vacated on appeal and the state of Washington retried Benn.  Benn was once again found guilty and the jury also found that the murders were committed as a single act.  Consequently, Benn was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.  Benn appealed his sentence, asserting that he was subjected to double jeopardy when the state realleged the “single act” aggravating factor as the jury’s failure to return a verdict as to whether this aggravating factor was present in his first trial constituted an implied acquittal. Continue reading →

Docket No. 78187-7 (from Court of Appeals Division III Case No. 23192-5)  Facts:  Petitioner Charlie Day was convicted of the manufacture of methamphetamine in the Superior Court for Benton County after a search of his automobile occasioned by it being illegally parked revealed evidence of methamphetamine manufacturing.  Day appealed his conviction, asserting that the warrantless search of his automobile lacked probable cause.  The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed Day’s conviction, holding that the search was based upon a reasonable suspicion that Day was engaged in criminal activity given that the police officer who found Day parked illegally noticed drug paraphernalia and an empty handgun case in Day’s automobile during their questioning of Day. Continue reading →

Docket No. 78383-7 (from Clark Case No. 05-2-02466-0)  Facts:  Petitioner Nichole Stewart-Graves’ son Liam was born without a heartbeat or spontaneous respiration but was eventually resuscitated by respondent Katherine Vaughn, the attending physician.  However, due to the fact that he was not breathing for over twenty minutes before Vaughn succeeded in resuscitating him, Liam was left with severe brain damage and other disabilities.  Stewart-Graves subsequently filed a medical malpractice action against Vaughn in the Superior Court for Clark County, asserting that Vaughn failed to obtain informed consent to continue resuscitation after ten minutes, at which point it was no longer reasonably possible for Liam to survive without severe brain damage, and that Vaughn breached the applicable standard of care by not discontinuing resuscitation at that point. Continue reading →

Docket No. 78353-5 (from Court of Appeals Division I Case No. 53645-1)  Facts:  After a judgment in which respondent Sayed Zia Ehsani had to pay money into David C. Cullen’s client trust account, Cullen distributed the funds under his clients’ direction (petitioner McCullough Family Partnership) to the clients’ creditors, including himself for legal services rendered. Ehsani successfully appealed and the trial court’s judgment was reversed. Continue reading →

Docket No. 78668-2 (from Court of Appeals Division II Case No. 32963-8)  Facts:  Lender U.S. Bancorp directed respondent T.D. Escrow Services, Inc. to commence foreclosure proceedings on a property after the borrower defaulted.  T.D. Escrow Services proceeded to employ A.B.C. Legal Services to conduct the foreclosure sale.  At the subsequent auction, petitioner William Udall was the high bidder and was given a receipt but not the deed of trust for the property.  When T.D. Escrow Services discovered that A.B.C. Legal Services had erroneously sold the property to Udall at a price $100,000 lower than it had authorized, it refused to deliver the deed of trust to Udall.  Udall responded by filing suit to quiet title.  The trial court granted summary judgment for Udall.  Upon appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the sale of the property had not been completed under the terms of Washington’s deed of trust act (Washington Revised Code §61.24) and that T.D. Escrow Services was therefore not required to deliver the deed of trust to Udall. Continue reading →